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Abstract 
More than half of the HIV/AIDS-infected population today are women. We study a dynamic 
model of (in)fidelity, which explains the HIV/AIDS gender gap by the configuration of sexual 
networks. Each individual desires sexual relationships with opposite sex individuals. Two 
Markov matching processes are defined, each corresponding to a different culture of gender 
relations. The first process leads to egalitarian pairwise stable networks in the long run, and 
HIV/AIDS is equally prevalent among men and women. The second process leads to anti-
egalitarian pairwise stable networks reflecting male domination, and women bear a greater 
burden. The results are consistent with empirical observations. 
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More than half of the over 34 million individuals who are infected with the AIDS virus today 
are women (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) (2010)). In sub-Saharan 
Africa where the AIDS epidemic is most concentrated, women represent 60% of the infected 
population (see Figure 1), which leads to 400, 000 more women than men dying from HIV/AIDS 
each year, a grave public health crisis. Why are women more affected by the HIV/AIDS burden? 
Early on, it was hypothesized that the male-to-female transmission rate of HIV is greater than the 
female-to-male transmission rate (World Health Organization (WHO) (2003)). However, this 
hypothesis was challenged in a ground-breaking study (Gray et al. (2001)) which showed that the 
female-to-male transmission rate is greater than the male-to-female transmission rate, although 
the difference is not statistically significant. The question of the origins of gender differences in 
HIV/AIDS prevalence is therefore still open.  
We propose that the HIV/AIDS gender gap can be explained by the configuration of sexual 
networks. Relying on the dynamic model introduced in Pongou and Serrano (2009), we uncover 
a simple social mechanism underlying long-run trends in HIV/AIDS gender gaps across 
heterosexual cultures. A fidelity mating economy where each individual desires to form sexual 
partnerships with agents of the opposite sex is considered. Networks that result from such 
interactions are called (in)fidelity networks. 
I. The Fidelity Model 
The formal setting is a mating economy consisting of a finite population of men (M) and 
women (W), both of equal size. We denote by m a typical man and by w a typical woman. Agents 
have preferences over the number of opposite sex partners. Each individual trades off the cost 
and the benefit of having partners, where the benefit function is strictly concave and the cost 
function convex, both being increasing in the number of sexual partners. Having no partner has 
no benefit and no cost. This yields a single-peaked utility function. Assuming peak-
homogeneous preferences on each side, *ms   and 
*
ws  denote the optimal number of partners for 
each man and for each woman, respectively. We assume that *ms >
*
ws , which can be justified by 
several factors, including a stronger preference over sex for men, or that the cost of having many 
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partners is greater for women. Finally, we assume that the population is sufficiently large relative 
to the optimal number of partners, which can be expressed as: 
*
**
||
)1(||
m
ww
s
s
M
sM  . 
Relationships are links in a network (a set of links between men and women). In a network g, 
)(gsi (or simply is ) denotes the number of partners that an individual i has in g.  
II. Static Stability of Fidelity Networks  
In a fidelity economy, individuals form new links or sever existing ones based on the reward 
that the resulting network offers them relative to the current network. A network is pairwise 
stable whenever: (i) no individual has an incentive to sever an existing link he or she is involved 
in; and (ii) no pair of a man and a woman have a strict incentive to form a new link between 
them while at the same time possibly severing some of their existing links.2  
Pongou and Serrano (2009) prove that a network is pairwise stable if and only if each woman 
has her optimal number of partners, and each man has at most his optimal number of partners. 
The intuition for this result is that women supply a smaller number of links than the ones 
demanded by men, which in turn results in only men competing for female partners while each 
woman is sure of having the number of male partners she desires.  
To understand trends in HIV/AIDS gender gaps, it is necessary to study the dynamics of 
fidelity networks, to which we now turn.  
III. Long-Run Fidelity Networks  
We consider a dynamic Markov matching process for the fidelity economy. In each period, a 
man and a woman, chosen at random with arbitrary positive probability, are given the 
opportunity to sever their link if they are linked in the current network, or to form a new link if 
they are not linked. Link severance is a unilateral decision, and link formation is a bilateral 
decision. While forming a new link, each agent is allowed to sever as many of the links he/she is 
involved in as possible in the current network. The long run predictions –steady or recurrent 
states– of this process coincide with the set of pairwise stable networks, a very large set.  
                                                 
2See Gale and Shapley (1962) for a first use of pairwise stability in two-sided matching markets. 
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We therefore perturb the dynamic process above by allowing agents to form or sever links 
even though such actions may not increase their utility. Two such perturbations are considered, 
each corresponding to a different culture of gender relations. We study the long-run predictions 
of these perturbed processes –their stochastically stable networks–, these are the only networks 
that form in the very long run.  
The perturbed processes, labelled 1P  and 

2P , are described as follows. In both, if a link 
formation is mutually beneficial or if a link severance is beneficial to its initiator, it occurs with 
probability 1. An action that worsens the initiator, which we call a mistake, occurs with a small 
probability 0 . Key to our analysis are actions that leave their initiators indifferent. These 
actions are referred to as (utility) neutral. In the spirit of assuming that more serious mistakes are 
less likely, the probability that an agent takes a neutral action always exceeds . We explain 
how.  
In the two processes, neutral actions uniquely correspond to situations in which an agent severs 
an existing link and forms a new link. We shall assume that the probability of such a neutral 
action is (.)f  where the exponent is less than 1. The exponent is the strength of the existing link 
so that stronger links –f(.) closer to 1– are harder to break.  
In the first perturbed process, the strength f(.) of a severed link is decreasing in the number of 
partners that the old partner had in the existing network. This link is as strong as the amount of 
time invested in it by the other partner. In contrast, the second perturbed process assumes that the 
strength of a severed link f(.) is increasing in the number of partners the old partner had. The 
partner who invests more time in a relationship is perceived as “weak” or dominated by the other 
partner; it is thus easier for the dominant partner to break the relationship (see, e.g., Caldwell 
(1976)). 
More precisely, assume that an agent i severs a link with k to form a new link with j. Then i 
takes this action with probability )/1( ksf  in the first process and )( ksf  in the second process, 
where f(.) is a strictly increasing function mapping into (0,1). 
Let ),...,,( 1 ko gggq   be a dynamic path from network 0g  to network kg . The resistance of q 
is the sum of the resistances of its transitions 


1
0
1),()(
k
t
tt ggrqr , where ),( 1tt ggr  is the 
weighted number of agents directly involved in the transition from tg  to 1tg  who do not find 
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this change profitable; it is the exponent of   in the corresponding transition probability. The 
probability of a transition ),( 1tt gg  is the product of the probabilities with which each of the 
agents involved in this transition takes the corresponding action.  
Intuitively, the resistance of a ),( 0 kgg -path q measures how hard it is for network 0g  to 
transition to kg . The set of stochastically stable networks is the set of networks that are the 
easiest to transition to in the universe of networks (see, e.g., Young (1998)).  
Pongou and Serrano (2009) show that in the first process, a network is stochastically stable if 
and only if it is egalitarian and pairwise stable: each person is matched to *ws  partners, the 
optimum for women. In the second process, a network is stochastically stable if and only if it is 
anti-egalitarian and pairwise stable: each matched man has *ms  partners (except for at most one 
man, who is matched to the remaining women); the rest of men are unmatched; and each woman 
is matched to her optimal number of partners *ws .   
  If 1* ws , serial monogamy, more common in western countries, is a salient particular case of 
the first process, whereas polygyny, more common in traditional societies, prevails in the second 
process. Empirically, each of the two processes is therefore consistent with a different 
sociological reality.  
IV. An Illustrative Example  
This section illustrates the two stochastic processes through a mating economy involving six 
men and six women where 3* ms  and 2* ws . Network 0g  in Figure 2 is a pairwise stable 
network that is not stochastically stable under either process. 0g  is described by the following 
matches:  
11 : wm  ( 1m  is matched with 1w ), 212 : wwm , 323 : wwm , 34 : wm , 6545 : wwwm , 6546 : wwwm .  
Our goal is to determine a network to which 0g  may converge under each of the processes 
following the path of least resistance.  
  Under 1P , without loss of generality, let us measure the strength of an existing link with the 
function ).2/(1)(  kk ssf  First, 4w   severs her link with 5m  and forms a link with 4m , with 
resistance 1/5 (note that if 4w  were to sever this new link with 4m  to link with 5m , the resistance 
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would be 1/4, which is larger). Second, 4w  again severs her link with 6m  to link with 1m  (with 
resistance 1/5, and 1/4 in the opposite direction). The resulting network is the egalitarian 
pairwise network 1h . Note that 5/25/15/1),( 1
0 hgr , which is smaller than 
2/14/14/1),( 01 ghr , which shows that going from 0g  to 1h  is infinitely more likely than 
the converse when   is very small.  
  Under 2p , without loss of generality, we measure the strength of an existing link with the 
function .||/)( Mssf kk   First, 1w  severs her link with 1m  and forms a link with 3m  (with 
resistance 1/6, and 3/6 in the opposite direction). Second, 3w  severs her link with 4m  to match 
with 2m  (with resistance of 1/6, and 3/6 in the opposite direction). The resulting network is the 
anti-egalitarian pairwise network 2h . Note that 3/16/16/1),( 2
0 hgr , which is smaller 
than 16/36/3),( 02 ghr , showing that going from 0g  to 2h  is infinitely more likely than 
the opposite when   is  very small.  
V. The Long-Run Gender Gap in HIV/AIDS Prevalence  
The results from Section III are used to understand the social mechanism underlying the 
HIV/AIDS gender gap in the long run in heterosexual societies. We recall a simple index of 
contagion. Let g be an n-person network that has k components, where a component is a maximal 
set of agents who are directly or indirectly connected in g. Let in , || iM  and || iW  be the number 
of individuals, men and women in the ith component ( ki 1 ), respectively. Pongou (2010) 
shows that if a random individual is infected with HIV, and if that individual infects his/her 
partners who also infect their other partners and so on, the fraction of infected people is given by 
the contagion potential of g ( )(g ) in Definition 1. The gender difference in the contagion 
potential of g is given by )(gF .  
Definition 1. (1) The contagion potential of g is: 


k
i
inn
g
1
2
2
1)( . 
(2) The gender difference in the contagion potential of g is: 


k
i
ii WMn
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2 ||||
2)( . 
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In equilibrium networks, sexual acts are repeated over long time periods, causing the HIV 
transmission probability to approach 1 as Definition 1 assumes, even if the transmission 
probability per coital act is smaller than 1.  
Pongou and Serrano (2009) show that: (1) for any stochastically stable network g of the 
perturbed process 1p , 0)( gF ;  and (2) for any stochastically stable network g of the 
perturbed process 2p , 0)( gF . 
This result implies that if a network is such that the spread of a random HIV infection would 
affect more men than women, then over time, that network will evolve towards an HIV-gender-
neutral network under the first process, and towards a female-infection-biased network under the 
second process. In the example in Section IV, the gender gap in HIV in the initial network 0g  is 
36
1)3234(
12
2)( 22222
0 gF , which means that the HIV prevalence would be 2.7 percent 
greater for men than for women if a random infection shock spreads. However, under the process 

1p , 
0g  would gradually evolve towards 1h  where the gender gap in HIV prevalence is  
0)( 1 hF , meaning that over time, the share of women among HIV-infected individuals would 
be close to 50%. Under the process 2p , 
0g  would gradually evolve towards network 2h  where 
the gender gap in HIV prevalence is 9/1)( 2 hF , which means that over time, the share of 
women among HIV-infected individuals will exceed that of men by 11 percentage points. 
VI. Concluding Remarks  
The analysis reveals that a key factor in the increased vulnerability of women to HIV/AIDS is 
that the optimal number of partners is greater for men than for women. In societies in which the 
first perturbed process prevails, women have an easier time breaking relationships with more 
promiscuous men, which leads to egalitarian pairwise stable networks and gender equality in 
HIV/AIDS prevalence in the long run. In societies where the second process prevails, the 
opposite holds, yielding anti-egalitarian pairwise stable networks and higher HIV/AIDS 
prevalence for women than for men.  The second process may therefore be viewed as describing 
male-dominant societies, whereas the first process describes societies where women have 
achieved more equality with men. Such a description, however, is a post-fact rationalization, as 
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all our assumptions, except the one on gender asymmetry in the optimal number of partners, are 
gender-neutral.  
The results are consistent with trends in gender differences in HIV/AIDS in most regions of 
the world, especially sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean where UNAIDS (2010) has 
established that heterosexual relationships are the main mode of HIV transmission – see Figure 
1.3 Our results also admit the possibility of HIV/AIDS being greater for men than for women at 
certain periods of the transition process. When this is the case, however, one should observe that 
the share of infected women is growing over time relative to the share of infected men, which is 
qualitatively consistent with trends in gender differences in HIV/AIDS in all regions of the 
world, including western societies (Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1: SHARE OF WOMEN AMONG HIV-INFECTED ADULTS (15 YEARS AND 
OLDER), 1990-2009 
 
Based on data from UNAIDS (2010) 
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FIGURE 2: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PERTURBED STOCHASTIC PROCESSES 

1p AND 

2p  
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